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This paper deals with one of the major issues in strategy and finance research streams i.e. the 
strategic use of valuable information among different business units of diversified firms. In 
particular, the paper studies the effect of information sharing between a commercial bank and a 
securities firm under the same financial group on analysts’ forecasts using Korean data over the 
period of 2000-2008. We find that the mean (median) EPS forecast error issued by independent 
analysts is 2.71% (1.34%) while that issued by bank-affiliated analysts is 2.09% (1.02%). The 
difference remains statistically significant even after controlling for company and analyst 
characteristics in multivariate analyses. The results are consistent with superior information 
hypothesis in that the bank-affiliated analysts make more accurate and conservative 
recommendations using the information generated by the commercial banks about the companies 
covered. This evidence suggests the efficiency of related-type business diversification which tends 
to foster the exchanges of value-generating information among business units. 
 






he performance effects of firm diversification have been extensively researched in the strategy and 
finance literature. The literature on diversification focuses on the economic rationale behind the 
diversification–performance relationship. Depending on whether the new business is similar or 
related to existing businesses, firms may diversify into related markets or unrelated markets. Related diversification 
is believed to lead to better performance than unrelated diversification because the former leverages significant 
business synergies while the latter suffers from agency costs and inefficient resource allocation (Amit & Livnat, 
1988).  
 
Teece (1980, 1982) theorized that the motive for diversification revolved around the reuse of physical 
resources, technological resources, and other intangible resources such as brand and reputation, which are indivisible 
and subject to market failure. The implied scope economies or synergies in key production factors or value-chain 
processes entail the well-acknowledged notion that related diversifiers outperform single-business firms or unrelated 
diversifiers (Palich, Cardinal & Miller, 2000; Rumelt, 1982; Tallman & Li, 1996). In related diversifiers, cross-unit 
business synergies can be created by, among others, intrafirm knowledge sharing (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; 
Tanriverdi, 2005). This study addresses the event of such information sharing among business units as source for 
value creation in corporate diversification strategy by investigating the example of Korean banking industry. 
 
Since the 1990s Korean banking industry has consolidated through continuous mergers and acquisitions.  
Recently, Hana Financial Group tries to acquire Korea Exchange Bank over the period of 2010-2011.  The industry 
T 
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is now dominated by the four largest financial conglomerates, Kookmin, Woori, Shinhan, and Hana.  Under each 
financial conglomerate, subsidiaries offer commercial banking as well as investment banking services, such as loans 
and deposits, debt and equity underwriting, and analyst coverage.  This financial conglomerate is similar to universal 
banking system in the U.S. since each financial group includes both commercial banking and investment banking 
businesses under one umbrella.  Under post-Great Depression laws, banking holding companies in the U.S. were not 
allowed to own investment banks while no such division existed in the Europe.  There has been considerable debates 
concerning the benefits and costs of the universal banking system since the U.S. relaxed the Glass-Steagall Act to 
allow commercial banks to participate in corporate securities underwritings in 1987.  The U.S. repealed the Act in 
1999 and allowed the universal banking since then.  The global financial crisis over the period of 2007-2009 has re-
ignited the controversy about the separation vs. integration of commercial and investment banking as many banking 
holding companies have acquired securities firms.  The governor of the Bank of England argued in January 2010 
that big banks must separate their higher-risk trading and investment banking businesses from their core deposit-
taking functions.  In 2010, President Obama also proposed that large banks collecting customer deposits be banned 
from engaging in proprietary trading activities.  However, many practitioners have opposed the idea of separating 
investment banking services from commercial banks.  While academic researchers have investigated the effect of 
universal banking on debt and equity underwriting, they neglect the accuracy of bank-affiliated analysts’ forecasts.  
In this study, we try to fill this void. 
 
As a subsidiary of a financial conglomerate, a commercial bank can exploit the information generated in-
house by their lending activities for other businesses.  Previous literature has extensively studied the certification 
role when commercial banks underwrite equities and bonds.  For instance, Krozner and Rajan (1994) examine bonds 
issued during the pre-Glass-Steagall period in the U.S. and find that among unrated issues, those that were 
underwritten by bank affiliates are less likely to default than those were underwritten by independent houses.  Massa 
and Rehman (2008) also examine the information flows between commercial banks and mutual funds within the 
same financial group.  They find that funds increase their stakes in the firms that borrow from their affiliated banks 
than other unaffiliated funds, and the performance of the positions of affiliated funds in the stocks of borrowing 
firms tend to be better.  While previous literature has examined the effect of universal banking on the pricing of 
securities or banks-mutual funds relation, we investigate whether knowledge spillovers regarding borrowing firms 
influence the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts using Korean data.  It is our understanding that this research is 
the first to study the relation between the universal banking and analysts’ forecasts. 
 
In Korea, bank holding companies have commercial banks and securities firms (or investment banks) as 
subsidiaries.  The tying of commercial banking and investment banking under the bank holding companies can be 
viewed as a universal banking.  Housing commercial banks and securities firms under the same roof could facilitate 
the transmission of information.  They can share the information through resource sharing, key personnel exchanges, 
and personal acquaintances.  In addition, when the securities firm underwrites securities of a company or issue 
analysts’ reports about the company, it can refer to the information produced by the commercial bank under the 
same bank holding company.  In an extreme case, bank-affiliated analysts could even be able to use the inside 
information acquired from the lending activity of the commercial bank to produce their reports.  Although the 
universal banking system can have a significant effect on financial markets, there has been little research on the 
Korean universal banking system. 
 
Korean commercial banks have founded securities firms since the 1990s.  All of the four largest Korean 
Financial Groups, KB, Shinhan, Woori, and Hana, have investment banks and commercial banks as subsidiaries as 
of 2008.  In addition, Korea Development Bank, IBK, and NH Bank have affiliated securities firms.  Out of 35 local 
securities firms, seven firms (20%) are operated under the universal banking system.  The firms routinely produce 
analysts’ reports as well as underwrite securities.  If bank-affiliated analysts can share the information that the 
affiliated commercial bank has accumulated about industrial companies by making and monitoring loans to the 
companies, they can have an informational advantage compared to other analysts when producing research reports.  
Since analysts tend to be overly optimistic about the companies they cover, we posit that the bank-affiliated analysts 
make more pessimistic forecasts than other analysts.  We call this conjecture “superior information hypothesis”. 
 
To test the hypothesis, we first classify Korean local analysts as bank-affiliated analysts and unaffiliated 
analysts. The bank-affiliated analysts work for the securities firms which are subsidiaries of banking holding 
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companies or affiliated with commercial banks while unaffiliated analysts work for other securities firms.  We 
compare the bank-affiliated analysts’ earnings forecasts on Korean industrial companies to other analysts’ forecasts 
over the period of 2000-2008.  We test the difference in the errors of the forecasts for the fiscal year-end earnings 
per share (EPS) issued by unaffiliated (or independent) versus bank-affiliated analysts. 
 
The mean (median) EPS forecast error issued by independent analysts is 2.71% (1.34%) while that issued 
by bank-affiliated analysts is 2.09% (1.02%).  The difference is statistically significant with a p-value of less than 
0.01.  We also find that the mean (median) absolute forecast error issued by independent analysts is significantly 
larger than that issued by bank-affiliated analysts.  These results suggest that the bank-affiliated analysts make more 
conservative and accurate forecasts than independent analysts.  In multivariate regression tests, the difference 
remains statistically significant even after controlling for company and analyst characteristics. The results are 
consistent with superior information hypothesis.  Information sharing between the commercial banks of borrowing 
company and affiliated securities firms results in more accurate forecasts by the bank-affiliated analysts.  The 
evidence corroborates the positive effects of universal banking system on financial intermediation.  Overall, our 
study contributes to extant literature by documenting the supporting evidence for the controversial universal banking 
system. 
 
The next section presents a summary of prior studies related to this research and develops the hypothesis.  
Section 3 discusses the data used in this research and Section 4 presents empirical results.  Section 5 concludes this 
study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Commercial banks obtain information about a firm over the period by making and monitoring loans to the 
firm.  Unlike commercial banks, investment banks do not acquire private information from lending activities.  
Therefore, commercial banks can be better informed than investment banks about the firm.  When commercial 
banks can underwrite securities issued by the firm, their underwritings can have a stronger certification effect than 
those of investment banks.  However, underwritings of commercial banks can create a conflict of interest.  For 
instance, by underwriting securities they privately know to be very risky and by requiring that the proceeds from the 
issue be used to pay down loans, the commercial banks can protect their own interests at the expense of investors 
buying the securities.  In contrast, underwritings of investment banks do not create the same conflict of interest since 
the investment banks do not make loans to the firm.  That is, the universal banking system has the benefit of the 
stronger certification effect as well as the cost of the conflict of interest.   
 
This research is related to previous literature on universal banking and the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.  
Previous studies have documented conflicting evidences which support the benefits or costs of the universal banking 
system.  Using the U.S. data, researchers generally find evidences supporting a stronger certification role of 
universal banks.  Similar to Krozner and Rajan (1994), Puri (1996) finds that, prior to the Great Depression, 
investors paid higher prices for industrial bonds and preferred stock underwritten by commercial banks than for 
those underwritten by independent investment banks.  Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997) also document that, 
among bonds issued with a low credit rating over the period of 1993-1995, bank underwritten bonds earn lower 
yields than do bonds underwritten by investment banks.  Drucker and Puri (2003) find that, using a large sample of 
seasoned equity offerings, universal banks reduce issuers’ financing costs.  In contrast, Kang and Liu (2007) find the 
evidence supporting the view of conflicts of interest created by universal banks using Japanese data.  In this 
research, we examine the effect of the integration of commercial and investment banking in Korea on the accuracy 
of analysts’ forecasts. 
 
Analyst optimism has been well documented in the previous literature
1
.  For instance, Fang and Yasuda 
(2006) find that buy recommendations in general do not contain information that is useful to investors since analysts 
tend to give overoptimistic advice.  Previous lending relationships allow a commercial bank to acquire private 
information about its client companies.  We conjecture that since affiliated banks accumulate the information about 
the companies they make loans to, bank-affiliated analysts have superior information about those companies that 
                                                 
1 Refer to Mehran and Stulz (2007) for a survey of analysts’ conflicts of interest. 
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external analysts do not have due to blocked access.” Through information sharing, the bank-affiliated analysts can 
issue more conservative and accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts.  Therefore, we test the following main 
hypothesis: 
 
H0: The bank-affiliated analysts issue more conservative and accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts. 
 
Our research is also related to previous findings on the accuracy of the analysts’ forecasts.  The literature 
has documented considerable evidences that analysts’ forecasts are affected by conflicts of interest.  Sell-side 
analysts working for an investment bank have pressure to provide optimistic recommendations on firms that can 
provide business to the investment bank, or to raise funds to repay loans to the commercial bank.  Analysts working 
in brokerage houses also have pressure to provide optimistic recommendations to attract trading revenues because 
upgrades attract more business than downgrades due to restrictions in short selling.
2
  The potential for this conflict 
of interest has spurred a large body of literature.
3
   Dugar and Nathan (1995), Michaely and Womack (1999), Cowen 
et al. (2006),  Ljungqvist et al. (2007), and Agrawal and Chen (2008) find evidence consistent with the conflict of 
interest that analysts affiliated with investment banks and brokers produce more optimistic earnings and are more 
likely to give buy recommendations.  The affiliated analysts are slower to revise downward their buy and hold 
recommendations (O’Brien, McNichols and Lin (2005)).  They also issue buy (sell) recommendations that 
underperform (outperform) those issued by non-affiliated analyst (Cliff (2004) and Barber, Lehavy and Trueman 
(2007)).  In addition, Mola (2005) finds empirical evidences that analysts of the lead underwriter have a tendency to 
downgrade companies that are competitors of their own underwritten IPOs, in order to support their own issues. 
 
Some empirical studies do not support the conflicts of interest hypothesis.  For instance, Clarke et al. 
(2004) find less optimistic and more accurate forecasts for the analysts of large investment banks compared to 
independent analysts.  Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2008) find that short-term earnings forecasts made by investment 
banks are more accurate and less optimistic than those made by independent research firms.  Clarke et al. (2007) 
document that All-Star analysts resist pressures from investment bankers.  They argue that the information 
advantage result in a high research quality of the affiliated analysts compared to the unaffiliated analysts.  Our study 
is similar to this line of research in that the Korean bank-affiliated analysts make use of informational advantage 
from the universal banking system.  The bank analysts can use the information generated by the affiliated-banks of 




To investigate the accuracy and optimism of bank-affiliated analysts’ forecasts, we will first obtain the 
analysts’ forecast data on South Korean companies from a database, FnConsensus of FnGuide.  The South Korean 
financial data provider, FnGuide, collects data on local analysts’ reports since 2000.  Due to this time limitation of 
the FnGuide’s data, our sample includes analysts’ forecasts over the period of 2000-2008.  We focus on local 
analysts’ reports since Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) document that local analysts make more precise earnings forecasts 
for companies in their countries than foreign analysts.  We focus on the main product made by the analysts, fiscal-
year-end earnings (EPS) forecasts in our sample, but exclude upcoming quarterly earnings forecasts for the 
companies covered.  Even though annual reports of companies are available two or three months after the end of a 
fiscal year, some information on earnings in the previous year is available right after the fiscal year-end.  Therefore, 
we exclude the analysts’ reports if the reports are issued after the end of a fiscal year.  We also exclude financial 
companies, since such companies are heavily regulated and less subject to information asymmetry than are industrial 
companies.  Our sample includes 106,034 EPS forecasts on 1,157 distinctive companies covered by some of 972 
distinctive analysts.  The companies are covered during some or whole sample period of 2000-2008. We get the 
issue dates of earnings forecasts, the names of security firms the analysts work for, and the closing stock prices on 
issuing dates from the FnConsensus. 
 
We then combine accounting and stock return data with the analysts’ forecasting data.  We obtain annual 
accounting data on the companies covered by analysts from Total Solution 2000 (TS 2000), a database compiled by 
                                                 
2 In the US the Security and Exchange Commission makes these conflict of interest available to investors at 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm. 
3 Mehran and Stutz (2007) provide an excellent summary of this literature. 
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the Korean Listed Companies’ Association.  We also obtain stock return data of the sample companies and Korean 
market index around the issue dates of analysts’ reports from a database (KIS-value) of Korean Information Service 
(KIS).  The KIS is affiliated with the Moody’s and is a leading provider of credit-related information and service in 
South Korea. 
 
Table 1 lists the names of commercial banks and the names of securities firms affiliated with the banks.  
All of the four largest financial groups in Korea have commercial banks and securities firms as subsidiaries as of 
2008.  Korean Development Bank, IBK, and NH Bank also own securities firms as subsidiaries.  Out of 29 local 
securities firms in our sample, 7 firms (24%) are affiliated with commercial banks as of 2008.  If analysts work for 




Table 1:  Securities Firms Under Universal Banking System 
Commercial bank or banking holding company name Securities firm name affiliated with the bank 
KB Financial Group KB Investment & Seccurities 
Shinhan Financial Group Shinhan Investment 
Hana Financial Group Hana Daetoo Securities 
Woori Financial Group Woori Investment & Securities 
IBK IBK Investment & Securities 
Korea Development Bank Daewoo Securities 
NH Bank NH Investment & Securities 
 
 
We report the number of companies covered, analysts, and securities firms, and descriptive statistics on 
analyst characteristics in Table 2.  Panel A of Table 2 presents the number of companies followed by analysts, the 
number of bank-affiliated and independent analysts, and the number of securities firms year by year.  In 2000, 332 
industrial companies are followed by analysts while 529 companies are covered in 2008.  Bank-affiliated analysts 
account for about 20% (24) out of 139 analysts in 2000 while they account for about 27% (135) out of 485 analysts 
in 2008.  Over the period of 2000-2008, bank-affiliated analyst-years represent 21% (701) out of 3,313 analyst-
years.  The number of securities firms ranges from 26 to 33 firms each year. 
 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:  Year-by-year Breakdown 
Year 
Number of companies 
followed by analysts 
Number of analysts Number of securities 
firms Independent Bank-affiliated 
2000 332 115 24 26 
2001 481 213 17 33 
2002 461 314 53 33 
2003 428 328 73 33 
2004 435 340 76 33 
2005 527 311 99 33 
2006 571 292 111 30 
2007 596 344 118 29 
2008 529 355 130 29 
Total 4,360 2,612 701 279 
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std Min Max 
EPS forecast error (FE) 2.60% 1.28% 7.04% -30.75% 39.53% 
Absolute EPS forecast error (ABSFE) 4.54% 2.37% 5.96% 0% 39.53% 
Number of analysts employed by securities firms 20.93 19 8.11 1 45 
Number of companies covered by each analyst-
year 
13.94 13 6.24 1 55 
Number of industry groups covered by each 
analyst-year 
4.76 4 2.27 1 24 
Number of days to fiscal year-ending 145 144 86 0 353 
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Panel A presents a year-by-year breakdown of analyst coverage for companies belonging to banks versus 
independent companies. The number of distinctive companies is 1,157 and the number of distinctive analysts is 972. 
The number of analysts who work for securities firms within banks versus independent analysts is also provided. 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for 106,034 earnings per share (EPS) forecasts and 102,178 stock 
recommendations. EPS forecast error is calculated as the ratio of the difference between the forecasted and actual 
EPS to the stock price, while absolute EPS forecast error represents the absolute value of the forecast error. The 
mean, median, standard deviation (std), minimum (min), and maximum (max) of the following variables are also 
presented: the number of analysts employed by securities firms, number of companies covered by each analyst-year, 
number of industry groups covered by each analyst-year, and number of days to fiscal year-ending. 
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of variables representing analyst characteristics. We 
calculate forecasting error (FE) and absolute forecasting error (ABSFE) using the forecasted EPS and actual EPS. 
Following Hong and Kubic (2003), we measure the forecast error by analyst i for company j on day t as follows: 
 
      
       
     
  (1) 
 
where      is the forecast of a year-end EPS issued by analyst i for company j on day t,    is the actual year-end EPS 
of the company j for the year, and       is a closing stock price of the company on day t-1.  ABSFE is the absolute 
value of the EPS forecast error (FE). 
 
Since outliers can distort our tests, we winsorize the top and bottom one percent of EPS forecast errors.  
The mean (median) FE is 2.60% (1.28%) with a standard deviation of 7.04%, which indicates that the analysts tend 
to make optimistic EPS forecasts on the companies covered. The mean (median) ABSFE is 4.54% (2.37%) with a 
standard deviation of 5.96%. 
 
The mean (median) number of analysts employed by each securities firm each year is about 21 (19) 
analysts. The mean number of companies covered by each analyst-year is 13.94 while the mean number of industries 
covered by each analyst-year is 4.67. The mean number of days from the day of issuing analysts’ reports to the fiscal 
year-end date is 145 days. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Using univariate tests, we first test whether there is a difference in analyst characteristics between 
independent and bank-affiliated analysts and report the results in Table 3.  The mean (median) EPS forecast error of 
2.71% (1.34%) made by independent analysts is significantly higher than that of 2.09% (1.02%) made by bank-
affiliated analysts with a p-value of less than 0.01.  This suggests that independent analysts tend to issue more 
optimistic EPS forecasts for industrial companies covered than bank-affiliated analysts.  The difference in absolute 
EPS forecast errors between independent vs. bank-affiliated analysts indicates that bank-affiliated analysts produce 
more accurate EPS forecasts than independent analysts. 
 
 







Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
EPS forecast error (FE) 2.71% 1.34% 2.09% 1.02% <0.01 <0.01 
Absolute EPS forecast error (ABSFE) 4.60% 2.39% 4.27% 2.24% <0.01 <0.01 
Number of analysts employed by securities 
firms 
20.49 19.00 23.04 23.00 <0.01 <0.01 
Number of companies covered by each 
analyst-year 
14.30 13.00 12.21 12.00 <0.01 <0.01 
Number of industry groups covered by 
each analyst-year 
4.90 5.00 4.10 4.00 <0.01 <0.01 
Number of days to fiscal year-ending 143 142 154 155 <0.01 <0.01 
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Univariate tests of the effects of bank affiliation on the sample are presented. The table presents the 
forecasts made by independent analysts versus bank-affiliated analysts. EPS forecast error is calculated as the ratio 
of the difference between the forecasted and actual EPS to the stock price while absolute forecast error represents 
the absolute value of the forecast error. In addition, the number of analysts employed by securities firms, number of 
companies covered by each analyst-year, number of industry groups covered by each analyst-year, and number of 
days to fiscal year-ending are compared. 
 
Following previous literature, we use number of analysts employed by securities firms each year to 
measure securities firm size.  Table 3 shows that bank-affiliated securities firm is significantly larger than 
independent securities firms.  Clement (1999) argues that analysts who work for larger securities firms can use 
better resources, which result in a higher research quality.  We use the number of companies and industry groups 
covered by each analyst-year to measure workloads of the analysts.  The table presents that bank-affiliated analysts 
cover significantly fewer number of companies and industries than independent analysts.  These results suggest that 
bank-affiliated analysts make more accurate EPS forecasts than independent analysts since they have more resources 
to use in their securities firms and a lighter workload.  The table also shows that the number of days from the 
issuance date of an analysts’ research report to fiscal year-ending date is more for bank-affiliated analysts than 
independent analysts. 
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results presented in Table 4 confirm the univariate test results 
in Table 3.  Regression models include variables to control for company and analysts’ characteristics following 
previous literature.  In Model 1, the dependent variable is EPS forecast errors (FE).  To control for the level of 
information asymmetry associated with the covered company, we include a natural log of assets, a ratio of long-term 
debt to assets, a ratio of intangible assets to assets, and a natural log of the number of analysts following in the 
regressions.  The coefficient on the log of assets is significantly negative (-0.004; p<0.01), indicating that analysts’ 
EPS forecasts tend to be more accurate for larger companies.  The coefficients on the ratio of long-term debt to 
assets and the ratio of intangible assets to assets are all positive and statistically significant, indicating that analysts’ 
forecast errors are bigger for the companies with higher leverage and more intangible assets. The coefficient on the 
number of analysts following is significantly negative, indicating that analysts’ EPS forecasts tend to be more 
accurate for companies with less information asymmetry. 
 
 
Table 4:  Determinants Of EPS Forecast Error (FE)-OLS Regression Analysis 
Variable 
Forecast errors (FE) 
Model 1 
Averaged forecast errors by analysts, 
companies, and year Model 2 
Intercept 0.144 0.114 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
Company characteristics 
Log (Assets) -0.004 -0.005 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
Ratio of long-term debt-to-assets 0.053 0.054 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
Ratio of intangible assets-to-assets 0.061 0.061 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
Log (number of analysts following) -0.015 -0.012 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
Analyst characteristics 
Log (number of analysts per securities firm) -0.002 0.001 
(<0.01) (0.49) 




Log (number of days to fiscal year-ending) 0.006 0.006 
(<0.01) (<0.01) 
Dummy for bank analysts -0.001 -0.003 
(0.01) (<0.01) 
Year dummies Included  
N 96,194 23,624 
Adjusted R-squared (%) 7.71 5.93 
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EPS forecast error is calculated as the ratio of the difference between the forecasted and actual EPS to the 
stock price. Log (Assets) is the natural log of the total assets. Dummy for bank analysts is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the forecast is issued by bank-affiliated analysts. The p-values for the coefficients are provided in 
parentheses. 
 
The regression models also control for the size of the securities firm issuing the forecast (a natural log of 
analysts per securities firm), the number of companies covered by the analyst issuing the forecast, and the number of 
days until the end of the fiscal year.  The coefficients of these control variables are all in the expected direction.  
Larger securities firms would be expected to be more experienced and employ a higher number of more talented 
analysts, leading to lower forecast errors.  As expected, the result in Table 4 shows a negative association between 
the number of analysts working for a securities firm and the accuracy in EPS forecast.  A higher number of 
companies covered by an analyst should reduce the available time and effort allocated to each forecast, leading to 
less accurate forecasts.  Consistent with the expectation, the coefficient on a natural log of number of companies 
covered by each analyst-year is significantly positive.  On the other hand, also as expected, the forecast errors are 
larger the longer the time between the recommendation and the release of the actual EPS at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
 
Our main focus in Table 4 is to examine whether EPS forecast errors made by bank-affiliated analysts are 
different from those made by other analysts.  To test this, we include a dummy variable indicating forecast errors 
made by the bank-affiliated analysts.  The coefficient on the dummy variable is -0.001 with p-value of 0.01 in 
Model 1, which means that the bank -affiliated analysts make more accurate EPS forecasts.  
 
We analyze analysts’ average forecast errors by analyst, company, and year in Model 2 of Table 4, since 
most of the control variables are measured annually.  The results in 
 
Models 2 are similar to those in Model 1.  The coefficient of the dummy variable for the bank-affiliated 
analysts in Model 2 is -0.003 with p-values of less than 0.01.  The results in Table 4 corroborate the findings 
presented in Table 3 that the bank-affiliated analysts tend to make more accurate earnings forecasts than 




We investigate the effects of information sharing between commercial banks and securities firms under the 
same financial groups on the accuracy of bank-affiliated analysts’ forecasts using Korean data over the period of 
2000-2008.  The bank-affiliated analysts under universal banking system can use the information generated by the 
commercial banks about the companies covered when they issue earnings forecasts. 
 
The information sharing between commercial banks and securities firms under universal banking make the 
bank-affiliated analysts more accurate EPS forecasts.  To be consistent with the superior information hypothesis, we 
find that bank-affiliated analysts make more conservative and accurate earnings forecasts than independent analysts. 
The evidence adds to the benefits of universal banking system. Commercial banks tend to accumulate the 
information on companies by making loans and monitoring. This study shows that the analysts can make more 
accurate earnings forecasts if they share the information generated by the commercial banks. 
 
As for contribution to the strategy literature, the findings of this study confirm the notion that related 
diversification can benefit from the exchange and sharing of valuable information among business units, thus 
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